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Abstract
Purpose – Underpricing is one of the most important anomalies associated with initial public
offerings (IPOs). The purpose of this paper is twofold; first, it examines the impact of underwriter’s
market share and spread on the underpricing of IPOs; and second, it investigates the effect of
management earnings forecasts bias and accuracy on the underpricing of IPOs.
Design/methodology/approach – A sample of 190 Malaysian IPOs listing on the main market of
Bursa Malaysia from January 1, 2002 to February 29, 2012 was used and collected data were analyzed
through univariate analysis and pooled ordinary least squares regression.
Findings – The empirical evidence shows that IPOs underwritten by underwriters as having high
market share and charging low underwriting spread experience higher level of underpricing.
The paper also finds that IPOs issued more biased earnings forecasts are related with severe
underpricing. Finally, this paper reveals that the more accurate the earnings forecasts are, the more
minimized will be the asymmetric information and hence, the less will be IPO underpricing.
Practical implications – The paper has some implications for policy makers, investors and
underwriters. First, this study offers some insights for policy makers who are responsible for
Malaysian financial markets current reforms. Further, knowing the importance of the economic
outcomes of the earnings forecasts on underpricing for policy makers, they may adopt the findings in
their discussion of costs of litigation and potential modifications in the requirements of issuing
earnings forecasts. For the investors, findings may improve their understanding of equity valuation
and for the underwriters, it would assist them in identifying underwriting cost.
Originality/value – This paper is considered the first study to extend IPO literature by investigating
the relationships between underwriter’s market share, underwriter’s spread, earnings forecasts bias,
earnings forecasts accuracy and IPO underpricing in an emerging country, such as Malaysia.
Keywords Malaysia, IPOs, Earnings forecasts bias and accuracy,
Underwriter’s market share and spread
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The puzzle of initial public offerings (IPO) underpricing is an interesting research field
that has caught academic scholars’ and researchers’ attention alike for the past
40 years[1]. In fact, the IPO underpricing seems to have reached a position of universal
phenomenon (Loughran et al., 1994; Ritter, 1984; Ritter and Welch, 2002; Chambers and
Dimson, 2009; Boulton et al., 2011). A widespread acknowledged notion is that IPO
underpricing goes against market efficiency and may adversely impact companies
attempting to raise capital in order to expand. This perception led to a major portion of
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literature to address this financial anomaly. For instance, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist
(2001) and Ritter and Welch (2002) reviewed several theories (i.e. asymmetric
information, winner’s curse and signaling) and reached to the conclusion that no single
theory is capable of clarifying underpricing. It is noteworthy that the studies dedicated
to South East Asia provided inconclusive findings. In the context of Malaysia,
IPO studies reported the existence of underpricing in the Malaysian IPO market
(e.g. Dawson, 1987; Yong and Isa, 2003; Prasad et al., 2006; Uddin, 2008; Murugesu and
Santhapparaj, 2009; Ahmad-Zaluki and Kect, 2012).
This paper is interested in shedding light on the association between underpricing
and underwriter’s market share and spread in addition to the bias and accuracy of
management earnings forecast[2]. Compounding the motivation is the fact that the
potential relationship between these variables and IPO underpricing has largely been
untouched. Hence, the present paper explains IPO underpricing wherein the issuers are
linked to superior quality underwriters along with the stress on the quality of disclosed
earnings forecasts within the IPO prospectuses. It is expected that offerings that are of
greater quality are underwritten by higher quality investment banks, and that the latter
possesses greater market share in light of IPO proceeds garnered (Megginson andWeiss,
1991). Nevertheless, this issue is still open for debate (Huang, 2012). Moreover,
underwriter spread reflects the risk bearing function of the underwriter and interacts
with IPO underpricing. It may therefore be contended that underwriter spread should
play a key role in clarifying the puzzle of IPO pricing if the spread variable represents
uncertainty concerning new issues pricing. Earnings forecasts are among the major
information that should be included in the IPO prospectus. Past studies reveal that the
accounting information, like earnings and book value of equity hold the key to IPO
pricing (Keasey and McGuinness, 1991; Klein, 1996; Beatty et al., 2002). In other words,
forecast studies can deepen our understanding on the IPO underpricing phenomenon.
The present study provides additional evidence regarding financial performance of
Malaysian IPO market. In particular, it contributes to existing literature in three ways;
first, it is the pioneering study to directly examine underwriting market share and IPO
underpricing in the context of Malaysian IPO. The Malaysian underwriting industry is
known for its high concentration, with the top underwriters as AmInvestment Bank
Berhad, CIMB Investment Bank Berhad, RHB Investment Bank Berhad and MIMB
Investment Bank Berhad. These underwriters constituted the most IPOs in Malaysia in
the years from 2002 to 2012 (in terms of number as well as value). It is worth noting that
Malaysia possesses an oligopolistic underwriting market that is driven by these four
main actors. Second, although underwriter spread constitutes the top portion of the
direct cost of new securities issuance, prior research dedicated to underwriter spread in
the context of Malaysia has not yet been performed. Hence, in the Malaysian IPO, the
effect of underwriter’s market share and spread on IPO underpricing remains an open
empirical question and our study seeks to fill these gaps.
Third, the earnings forecasts role in signaling the market value of IPOs and in
clarifying initial returns (IR) of stock has not been fully explored in the literature of
accounting and finance (e.g. Clarkson et al., 1992; How, 1996; Firth, 1998; Jog and
McConomy, 2003). The present study fills such a void left by prior studies. In this
study, the relative underpricing throughout the sample companies is tested to provide
evidence of the proposition that earnings forecasts decrease asymmetric information
and ex ante uncertainty (Rock, 1986; Beatty and Ritter, 1986). Furthermore, according
to Ljungqvist (2007), information has first-order effects on underpricing and hence,







































the quality information differences that are provided to investors. The present study’s
contribution to literature lies in its supply of evidence on the economic consequences of
the incorporation of management earnings forecasts within the IPO prospectus.
The findings show that on average, the underpricing level in the Malaysian IPO
market is 21.22 percent. Further, this study shows that underwriters’ market share is
positively but insignificantly related to IPO underpricing. With regards to underwriter’s
spread, although it is one of the methods for pricing the IPO company’s risk, the spread is
found to be negatively but insignificantly linked with underpricing. The association
between earnings forecasts error and IPO underpricing is also noted. The study found
that IPO companies having biased earnings forecasts are more underpriced compared to
those with unbiased and cautious earnings forecasts. Finally, our result indicates that the
accuracy of management earnings forecasts do decrease the IPO underpricing.
The rest of the study is organized as follows; Section 2 provides the prior literature
and hypotheses concerning the IPO underpricing determinants. Section 3 discusses
the data selection process, data sources, empirical methods and Sections 4 and 5 provide
the results and additional analysis. Finally, the paper is summarized in Section 6.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1 Underwriter’s market share
Activities related to corporate finance, such as securities issuance, offer great revenues for
underwriting banks. Thus, underwriters are in great competition for new businesses of
underwriting. This behavior is specifically true in the IPO market as underwriting fees as
a percentage of proceeds raised, are more significant for IPOs compared to seasoned
equity or debt offerings (Dunbar, 2000). The underwriter may have to face the loss of
future revenues of new issues owing to its association with the overpriced offering. Hence,
the underwriting bank’s market share will be reduced in the future as investors may be
hesitant in trusting its future issues pricing. Further, the management of future IPOs are
likely to refrain from using a bank that is associated with significant underpricing. In fact,
their reputation is damaged every time they generate inaccurate information, which leads
to inaccurate pricing (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). These market share effects are
expected to be greater in established banks as their reputation is more at risk.
Moreover, underpricing is quite pricey to the issuing company and hence, low-risk
companies try to relay their low-risk features to the market by employing an
underwriter with a good reputation (Carter and Manaster, 1990). The selection of such
an underwriter could be considered as a signal where high-quality underwriters will be
chosen by companies with good news and information (Titman and Trueman, 1986).
The reputation of the underwriter can minimize the adverse selection and moral hazard
issues and in effect, decrease the ex ante uncertainty linked with IPO (Cooney et al.,
2001). Similarly, according to empirical evidence (e.g. Carter and Manaster, 1990; Carter
et al., 1998), underwriters are more inclined to underwrite issues of low-dispersion
companies, and low-dispersion companies are often linked to less underpricing. Other
researchers (Kenourgios et al., 2007; Jones and Swaleheen, 2010) reported that the
reputation of the underwriter significantly influence the IPO underpricing level.
Evidence was presented by Megginson and Weiss (1991) to the fact that lower
underpricing is related to the underwriter’s relative market shares. To this end, prior
literature and arguments suggest that underpricing should be inversely associated to
the IPO’s underwriter’s market share. Hence, the present study hypothesized that:









































As mentioned before, underwriters have a key role in the process of IPO as they are
advisors to the issuing company, they set offer prices and they sell the new issues.
In return, they are compensated in the IPO process in terms of gross spread. Thus,
the underwriting spread is the revenue that is generated by the underwriters when they
underwrite the new issues. The underwriting services price has great implications for
investors. For example, underwriting fees may be associated to the offer price and the
underpricing level (Chen et al., 2006). The industry of underwriting should therefore be
characterized by high competition with low profit margins (Bartling and Park, 2009).
The revenue of underwriters are obtained from the spread, which is composed of
two elements, namely, fixed and variable. The former is often linked with the offer size
while the variable is linked with price uncertainty of the new issue (Chen and Mohan,
2002). This is explained by the fact that underwriters face loss if the IPO sells at a price
lower than the preset offering price. Underwriters are however prevented from selling
the issue at a higher price with the increase of market price. Thus, underwriter spread
comprises compensation for the risk bearing function. In other words, underwriters
tend to underprice the new issues so that the IPO will be completely subscribed
and increase in price directly after the offer (McDonald and Fisher, 1972). That is,
the proportion of spread is directly associated to the risk for each new issue.
The perception is that higher uncertainty about the future equilibrium price
encourages underwriters to underprice the new issues and therefore charge specific
level of spread that would be sufficient to bear the full cost of risk. Thus, the variables
underpricing and spread complement each other and the association between them
hinges on the issuing company’s attributes and the power of negotiation, level of
competition in the market and the underwriter’s strategies of pricing. The variable
of spread is included in this study as the underwriter spread may be limited by
regulation or competition or both in a way that different underpricing levels are
required for full cost of risk bearing absorption. The spread encourages the investment
bank to select risky prices. If the spread is considerably low, banks steer clear of
failing IPO and set a corresponding low, risk-free price, and at this price level, there
would be great level of underpricing. Chen and Mohan (2002) claimed that spread is
significantly and positively associated with IPO underpricing, which leads us to the
following hypothesis:
H2. Underwriter’s spread are positively associated with IPO underpricing.
2.3 Earnings forecasts bias
The earnings forecasts, provided by the management in the prospectuses of Malaysian
IPOs, offer considerable information for potential investors in Malaysia. The lack of
prior record of forecasts accuracy will lead investors to assess earnings forecasts and to
determine which of them are overly optimistic and which are pessimistic. Upon
successful differentiation of pessimistic forecasts from optimistic forecasts, investors
then have the ability to distinguish the premium levels that are related to the accuracy
of forecasts ( Jelic et al., 2001). As such, less underpricing would be expected for
conservative (unbiased) forecasts. However, if investors are unable to evaluate the bias
in forecasts, they will be inclined to pay a premium for IPOs disclosing optimistic
forecast, and this may lead to higher underpricing for such companies. Investors’
ability in analyzing earnings forecasts at the time of their disclosure should be noted in







































aware of the bias level, stock prices may show overly optimistic earnings forecasts.
Overly optimistic forecasts will consequently lead to higher information asymmetry.
Hence, it is hypothesized that the higher the management earnings forecasts error, the
greater will be the information asymmetry, and the greater will be the underpricing.
We therefore propose a positive association between forecast bias and the
underpricing. We specify the following hypothesis:
H3. Earnings forecasts bias is positively associated with IPO underpricing.
2.4 Earnings forecasts accuracy
IPOs are found to be less underpriced in countries where existing public companies
generate greater quality earnings information (Boulton et al., 2011). Additionally, large
underpricing in the immediate after market can signal great forecast error. Some
managers become evidently incapable of hiding their inability to offer accurate
earnings forecasts so they underprice issues to attract potential investors. If the issue
price is considered as a function of the earnings forecasts and underpricing is a fixed
percentage, then any noted differences in the IR may be due to the investor’s
perceptions of the accuracy of earnings forecasts. The forecasts accuracy-IR
relationship may also be explained by Benveniste and Spindt’s (1989) model. The
model postulates that the IR is a positive uncertainty function; stated differently, the
greater the forecasts error, the higher will be the uncertainty and underpricing.
However, accurate earnings forecasts will accordingly result in less information
asymmetry. Therefore, it is suggested that the greater the management earnings
forecasts accuracy, the lesser will be the information asymmetry, and the lesser will be
the underpricing. Based on the above, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H4. Earnings forecasts accuracy is negatively associated with IPO underpricing.
3. Data and research method
3.1 Data
This study’s data cover the publicly available information, gathered from the IPO
prospectuses and annual reports of the listed companies in Bursa Malaysia. The
study’s sample includes companies that were incorporated on the main market of Bursa
Malaysia for the duration 2002-2012. As of February 29, 2012, 265 financial and non-
financial IPOs are listed on the main market. Financial companies, close-end fund and
real estate investment trust companies are excluded following the studies of
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010).
Accordingly, three companies from the finance sector, one from close-end fund and
fourteen from the real estate investment trust were not included. Two infrastructure
project companies were also excluded as proposed by Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2007). These
industries are not included as their regulatory requirements are different from the
sample companies. Moreover, IPOs that did not issue management earnings forecasts
in the prospectus are omitted from the sample. Accordingly 54 IPO companies without
earnings forecasts and 21 with different regulatory regimes were excluded which
resulted in the final sample of 190 IPO companies.
3.2 Research methods
As with prior IPO studies dedicated to performance, underpricing is proxied by the IR








































initial day of trading and the initial offering price, expressed as a percentage of the
initial offering price. A positive value indicates an underpriced security. The IR on
the first trading day is therefore calculated as follows:
IRi;t ¼ Pi;1 –Pi;0
 
=Pi;0
  100% (1)
where IRi,t is the IR of company i; Pi,1 is the closing price of company i at the end of the
first trading day; Pi,0 is the offer price of company i.
We test our four hypotheses regarding the impact of underwriter’s reputation and
spread and the impact of earnings forecasts bias and accuracy on the IPO underpricing
using both of univarate analysis and multivariate regression analysis. In the
multivariate regression analysis we use IR as dependent variable and underwriter’s
reputation, underwriter’s spread, earnings forecasts bias, earnings forecasts accuracy
as independent variables. We also include a number of control variables such as family
ownership, management ownership, auditor’s quality, size, age, forecasts horizon and
leverage. These control variables were generally employed in prior IPO researches as
proxies for the apparent IPOs risk. They are expected to capture the potential impact of
ownership, auditor’s prestige, forecasts horizon and company’s size, age and leverage
on underpricing of the IPO companies. Our pooled ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression model is presented as follows:
IRi;t ¼ b0þb1UND_MSi;tþb2UND_SPRi;tþb3 EF_BIASi;t
þb4 EF  ACCURACY i;tþb5 FOWNi;tþb6MOWNi;tþb7AUDi;t
þb8 CSIZEi;tþb9 CAGEi;tþb10 FHORIZONi;tþb11 LEVi;tþe (2)
where UND_MSi,t (underwriter’s market share) is the ringgit value for all shares
underwritten by the underwriter divided by the ringgit value of all underwritten IPOs
in the sample; UND_SPRi,t (underwriter’s spread) the ratio of the gross fees charged
by the underwriter including underwriting commission, management fees, sales
commissions and other fees charged by the underwriter to the gross proceeds of
the issue; EF_BIASi,t (forecasts bias) the difference between actual earnings and the
earnings forecasts scaled by absolute earnings forecasts; EF_ACCURACYi,t (forecasts
accuracy) the absolute difference between the actual earnings and the earnings
forecasts divided by the absolute earnings forecasts; FOWNi,t (family ownership) the
percentage of shares retained by the family directors on the IPO board of directors;
MOWNi,t (management ownership) the percentage of shares retained by the executive
directors on the IPO board of directors; AUDi,t (auditor’s quality) a binary variable
equal to “1” if the auditor of IPO company is Big 4 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte,
KPMG, Ernst and Young) and “0” otherwise, CSIZEi,t (company size) the natural
logarithm of total assets, at the date of IPO prospectus; CAGEi,t (company age) the
natural logarithm of (1+ number of years between the date of establishment and
the date of IPO); FHORIZONi,t (forecasts horizon) the number of months from the
management forecast date (prospectus date) to end of the period for which the forecast
is made; LEVi,t (leverage) the the percentage of total liabilities over the total assets.
4. Analysis
4.1 Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics of IR of Malaysian IPOs for the years 2002-2012 are presented







































deviation of 34.04 percent. Contrary to prior studies dedicated to Malaysian IPOs, the
present study reports a significantly lower average amount of underpricing at the level
of 1 percent through t-test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Specifically, underpricing
varies from −33.33 percent (the lowest return displayed by Sin Chew Media
Corporation Berhad on October 18, 2004), to 245.45 percent (the highest return
displayed by PMB Technology Berhad on November 5, 2003). These findings show
that the average level of IPO underpricing is lower compared to the percentage revealed
by prior authors (e.g. Dawson, 1987 at 166.7 percent; Jelic et al., 2001 at 99 percent; Yong
and Isa, 2003 at 94.91 percent; Murugesu and Santhapparaj, 2009 at 81 percent).
In general, IPO underpricing decreased from the last period until 2012. This lower
average underpricing indicates that some IPO issues in Malaysia have been resolved
and become more efficient through the new method liberalized by the Securities
Commission in 1996, namely, market-based pricing. This mechanism placed the total
responsibility on issuers and advisers and allowed them to set IPOs price.
Panel A: descriptive statistics of the underpricing of 190 Malaysian IPOs between 2002 2012
Dependent
variable
Mean Median SD Min. Max. t-test Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test
t-value p-value z-value p-value
IR 21.22 12.92 34.04 −33.33 245.45 8.590 0.000 1.937 0.001
Panel B: distribution of IR
n Percentage
IRo0% 29 15.26
0%o IRW25% 98 51.58
25%o IRW50% 36 18.95
50%o IRW75% 20 10.53
75%o IRW100% 2 1.05
IRW100% 5 2.63
Total 190 100
Panel C: IPO underpricing (yearly)
Year n Mean Median SD
2002 43 14.52 7.69 25.98
2003 36 41.38 34.52 44.89
2004 41 26.57 20.00 39.41
2005 26 6.14 0.00 17.26
2006 14 11.25 12.14 20.79
2007 19 24.69 17.65 26.07
2008 10 1.12 3.19 19.27
2009 – – – –
2010 – – – –
2011 – – – –
2012 1 30.00 30.00 0
Notes: This table exhibits the summary statistics of the initial return (IR) as proxy of
the underpricing for the 190 Malaysian IPOs. Average raw initial returns are computed on the basis
of equally weighted. IR¼ (closing price− offer price)/offer price)× 100 percent. Distribution of
raw initial return is presented in Panel B. In Panel C, most IPO companies did not issue earnings
forecasts in 2009, 2010, 2011 (the only IPOs that issued earnings forecast were from real estate
investment trust sector, which is excluded from our sample). p-values show the level of significance
for the two-tailed t-test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of mean and median, respectively, at the












































Panel B displays that majority of the IPO companies, numbering 98 IPOs reported
underpricing at 0-25 percent. The samples performance throughout the years and their
IPOs underpricing are also presented in Panel C, with no overpricing in any year. Panel
C indicates that the greatest level of underpricing at the Malaysian IPO market was
experienced in 2003 with a mean and standard deviation of 41.38 and 44.89 percent,
respectively. On the other hand, the lowest degree of underpricing was experienced in
2008 with a mean and standard deviation of 1.12 and 19.27 percent, respectively.
The descriptive statistics of IPO samples are also presented in Table II. The table
indicates that the mean underwriter market share is 11 percent, a minimum of 0.07
percent by Kenanga Investment Bank Berhad and a maximum of 28.35 percent by
CIMB Investment Bank Berhad. In total, 13 Malaysian investment banks played a key
role in underwriting in the period under study. However, only five of these underwriters
have played a leading role of over 15 new issues (53, 51, 18, 18 and 16)[3]. These banks
were deemed to have the highest market share, with the total market share of the top
five underwriters to be over 54.44 percent. This indicates that the Malaysian
underwriting industry is quite concentrated. From the list, CIMB Investment Bank
Berhad and RHB Investment Bank Berhad are both leading the industry with 28.35 and
16.14 percent market shares, respectively. Meanwhile, the mean underwriter spread is
4.82 percent and the median is 2.01 percent. As for the maximum underwriting spread,
it is charged by CIMB Investment Bank Berhad at 15.93 percent on the issues of DXN
Holdings Berhad. The mean of underwriting spread in Malaysia is quite similar to
those in the Korean IPO market (5.93 percent in Ahn et al., 2007) as well as in Australian
IPO market (3.7 percent in How and Yeo, 2001).
Mean Median SD Min Max
UND_MS (%) 11 6.03 11.07 0.07 28.35
UND_SPR (%) 4.82 2.01 1.84 0.12 15.93
EF_BIAS (%) 3.36 1.12 54.50 −176.04 525.45
EF-ACCURACY (%) 24.94 9.37 48.54 0.13 525.45
FOWN (%) 15.68 5.52 19.37 0.00 66.13
MOWN (%) 11.76 4.15 15.58 0.00 66.94
AUD (%) 54.74 – – – –
CSIZE (RM million) 350.11 101.19 1,402.58 35.12 17,073.86
CAGE (years) 5.53 2.25 6.95 0.17 32.67
FHORIZON (months) 7.71 7.00 3.01 3.00 14.00
LEV (%) 51.04 47.83 23.89 3.86 150.48
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics of the IPO companies used in this study. UND_MS
is the ringgit value for all shares underwritten by the underwriter divided by the ringgit value of all
IPOs in the sample. UND_SPR is the ratio of the gross fees charged by the underwriter including
underwriting commission, management fees, sales commissions and other fees charged by the
underwriter to the gross proceeds of the issue. Earnings forecasts bias (EF_BIAS)¼ (actual
earnings−forecast earnings)/| forecast earnings|. Earnings forecasts accuracy (EF-ACCURACY)¼
| (actual earnings− forecast earnings)|/| forecast earnings|. FOWN is the percentage of shares retained
by the family members on the IPO board of directors. MOWN is the percentage of shares retained by
the executive directors on the IPO board of directors. AUD is a dummy variable equal to “1” if auditor
is Big 4 and “0” otherwise. CSIZE is the ln of total assets, at the date of IPO prospectus. CAGE is the
ln (1+ number of years between incorporation date and the IPO date). FHORIZON is the number of
months between the management forecast date (prospectus date) to end of the period for which the












































The findings of the mean of forecasts bias is 3.36 percent with the positive sign
indicating that actual earnings are normally greater than the forecasted earnings in the
prospectuses, and hence, the forecasts are pessimistic. This mean is significantly lower
than the mean reported in prior studies conducted in Malaysia (i.e. 9.34 percent in
Mohamad et al., 1994; 33.37 percent in Jelic et al., 1998), but akin to Hussin et al.’s (2004)
study that reported 2.10 percent. This shows that general reduction in the forecast bias
of Malaysian IPOs is to be expected over time. Moreover, the forecasts accuracy mean
for the samples is 24.94 percent, indicating that the earnings forecasts accuracy
is greater compared to the accuracy reported in prior studies in Malaysia (i.e. Mohamad
et al., 1994 reported 28 percent), in Thailand (Lonkani and Firth, 2005 reported
35.67 percent) and in Australia (Firth et al., 2012 reported 34.49 percent), and lower
compared to other countries – in Hong Kong (McGuinness, 2005 reported 7.26 percent),
in New Zealand (Firth, 1997 reported 11.10 percent) and similar to Ahmad Zaluki and
Wan-Hussin’s (2010) study that reported 23.76 percent.
Furthermore, a percentage constituting 15.68 percent with maximum of
66.13 percent and a minimum of 0 percent is shares owned by the family members
on the IPO companies’ boards. The executive directors retain an average percentage of
shares equating to 11.76 percent of the whole sample. Around 54.74 percent
constituting 104 IPOs have been audited by the Big 4. The IPO companies size greatly
differs, with the largest company, namely, Plus Express Ways Berhad, having a total
asset amounting to RM17073.86 million. The least size is TAFI Industries Berhad with
35.12 million. The average operating history of the IPO sample is about 5.53 years,
minimum of 0.17 year and maximum of 32.67 years. In addition, the average forecasts
horizon is approximately 7.71 months. With regards to the leverage, the mean of
liabilities to total asset is 51.04 percent.
4.2 Univariate analysis
The univariate analysis for the whole sample on the basis of subgroups of each
experimental variable is listed in Table III. The hypotheses are tested by developing
two portfolios based on high and low underwriter’s market share, underwriter’s spread
and accuracy of earnings forecasts. As for the bias in earnings forecasts, two groups
are developed based on optimistic and pessimistic forecasts.
The results presented in Panel A of Table III indicate that underwriters with great
market share are inclined to increase initial underpricing, which is contrary to the
reported results of underwriter’s role (e.g. Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Carter et al., 1998;
Ahmad-Zaluki and Kect, 2012). The results of the parametric t-test and non-parametric
Mann-Whitney test show significant differences at the level of 1 percent between average
returns of IPOs underwritten with high market share and IPOs underwritten by their less
market share counterparts. This result is inconsistent with our hypothesis one,
suggesting that underwriter market share is negatively related with underpricing. The
result of underwriter’s spread, depending on the distribution of sample, is remarkable.
The group sample of high spread reported underpricing of 17.44 percent while the low
spread group reported underpricing of 24.55 percent. The difference between them shows
a statistical significance at the level of 5 percent on the basis of non-parametric Mann-
Whitney test. In other words, the Malaysian IPO companies that paid high underwriting
spread are more likely to be less underpriced – a fact inconsistent with the findings of
Chen and Mohan (2002) who reported that companies paying high spread to
underwriters are related to greater underpricing compared to those who paid low







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Based on the results, companies having accurate earnings forecasts are more
underpriced compared to those with inaccurate ones. The difference is however
insignificant. Specifically, the riskiest IPOs related with low accuracy (with
EF-ACCURACY greater than 9.37 percent) display a lower underpricing level. This
does not support Gounopoulos (2011) and also rejects hypothesis four of this study.
In Panel B of Table III, IPOs with pessimistic earnings forecasts are linked with higher
degrees of underpricing in the immediate after market. The difference between
optimistic and pessimistic companies in terms of underpricing level is statistically
significant at a 10 percent level according to the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test.
Despite the fact that the optimism degree is not known at the time of IPO,
the underpricing is lower for the optimistic forecasts, even though the forecasts turned
out to be biased. Furthermore, this is evidence that Malaysian market has no
mechanisms to recognize IPOs with optimistic forecasts. This result is also inconsistent
with our hypothesis three, but in line with the results of Firth (1998), Chen et al. (2001),
Jelic et al. (2001) and Jog and McConomy (2003).
4.3 Pairwise correlation
The Pearson correlation coefficients matrix for the entire variables in this study is
listed in Table IV. We also present the Spearman correlation above the diagonal in an
effort to mitigate the effect of outliers. The market share of underwriters is significantly
and positively associated with the reputation of the auditor and the size of the IPO
company. However, it is negatively associated with forecast bias, forecast accuracy,
family ownership, management ownership and leverage. Of particular interest is that a
negative relationship is found between the underwriter’s market share and spread,
indicating that underwriters with high market share may need smaller spread for the
underwriting contract. This is supported by Carter and Dark’s (1992) and Chen and
Mohan’s (2002) argument that reputable underwriters have a tendency to mitigate IPO
spread. On a closer examination of the underwriter spread-other variables relationship,
the spread is highlighted to be significantly and negatively associated with the
company size. Furthermore, the underwriter spread is negatively but insignificantly
associated with forecast bias and accuracy. Forecast errors along with absolute
forecast error are significantly and positively associated with family ownership and
management ownership. On a final note, forecast error is found to be negatively and
significantly associated with the IPO company’s leverage percentage. Further,
from Table IV we can validate the nonexistence of multicolinearity between the
independent variables since no correlation coefficient goes further than 0.8.
4.4 Pooled OLS regression of IR and independent variables
For hypotheses testing, Equation (2) is tested by employing pooled OLS multiple
regression. More specifically, the multivariate regression analysis was run to examine
the relations among the level of IPO IR, market share of underwriter, spread of
underwriter, earnings forecasts bias and earnings forecasts accuracy, along with
additional control variables. Specifically, we present two regression model results
in Table V. Columns 3 and 4 report the results of the first regression model (Model 1),
which consider all experimental variables without any control variables, and columns 5
and 6 show the results of the second regression model (Model 2), which consider all
experimental variables, and other control variables. The results from the regression of

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of the Model 1 without control variables. The only difference is that the underwriter’s
spread (UND_SPR) is found to be significantly related with IPO underpricing in
Model 1 while not in Model 2. Further, earnings forecasts accuracy (EF-ACCURACY) is
found to be significantly associated with IPO underpricing in Model 2 while not in
Model 1. However, the significance level and adjusted R-squared of Model 2 is higher
than those reported for Model 1, suggesting that it is important to include the control
variables in our pooled regressions.
Focussing on the results of Model 2, the results presented that in contrast to the first
hypothesis, the underwriter’s market share (UND_MS) is positively and insignificantly
associated with underpricing. This result goes against the result reached by prior
studies that underwriter’s reputation is negatively and significantly related to IR
(e.g. Carter and Manaster, 1990; Carter et al., 1998). However, this result is in line with





Expected sign Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Experimental variables
UND_MS − 0.048 0.39 0.125 0.99
UND_SPR + −1.381 −1.91** −0.924 −0.95
EF_BIAS + 0.079 2.21** 0.099 2.86**
EF-ACCURACY − −0.053 −1.30 −0.075 −1.96*
Control variables
FOWN − −0.024 −0.29
MOWN − −0.144 −1.38
AUD − 0.916 0.32
CSIZE − −4.639 −2.94**
CAGE − 3.535 2.21*
FHORIZON + 1.506 3.23**
LEV + −6.313 −1.04
Constant 16.337 5.33*** 57.143 3.02**
n 164 164
Adjusted R2 2.41% 12.69%
F-value 2.40** 3.150***
Notes: This table reports pooled OLS regression results explaining the dependent variable (IR).
UND_MS is the ringgit value for all shares underwritten by the underwriter divided by the ringgit
value of all IPOs in the sample. UND_SPR is the ratio of the gross fees charged by the underwriter
including underwriting commission, management fees, sales commissions and other fees charged by
the underwriter to the gross proceeds of the issue. Earnings forecasts bias (EF_BIAS)¼ (actual
earnings− forecast earnings)/| forecast earnings|. Earnings forecasts accuracy (EF-ACCURACY)¼
| (actual earnings−forecast earnings)|/| forecast earnings|. FOWN is the percentage of shares retained
by the family members on the IPO board of directors. MOWN is the percentage of shares retained by
the executive directors on the IPO board of directors. AUD is a dummy variable equal to “1” if auditor
is Big 4 and “0” otherwise. CSIZE is the ln of total assets, at the date of IPO prospectus. CAGE is the ln
(1+ number of years between incorporation date and the IPO date). FHORIZON is the number of
months between the management forecast date (prospectus date) to end of the period for which the
forecast has been conducted. LEV is total liabilities over the total assets. According to Belsley et al.
(1980), outliers are identified when the absolute values of the observations’ studentized residuals are
two or greater. To confirm and delete the outliers, this study conducts the studentized residuals test.
Therefore, 26 IPO companies have been removed from the sample. *,**,***Significant at the 10, 5 and











































Specifically, Beatty and Welch (1996) reported a positive association between
underpricing and underwriter reputation and suggested that the underwriter behavior
change may be attributed to economic situations. This result also follows Kirkulak and
Davis’s (2005) study that involved data from IPOs in Japan and suggested that
reputable underwriters are associated with a greater degree of underpricing. Similarly,
Bates and Dunbar (2002) showed that positive association between market share of
reputable underwriters and underpricing indicates a structural change in the US IPO
market owing to the high-tech boom. On the other hand, Loughran and Ritter (2004)
showed inconclusive findings – they showed a negative relationship between 1980 and
1989 and a positive one in 1990-1998, 1999-2000 and 2001-2003. This reversal is
attributed in part to the changes in the objective function of the issuer. Based on their
hypothesis, issuers in the 1990s were more concerned with analyst research coverage
rather than underpricing and they had the tendency to accept higher underpricing from
an underwriter who provides higher analyst coverage. According to Logue et al. (2002),
pre-market underwriting activities rather than the reputation of the underwriter plays a
part on IPO returns. Their findings supported no significant negative relationship
between reputation of underwriter and IPO underpricing.
More importantly, the present study’s result of underwriter’s spread (UND_MS), is
not similar to the results in the IPO underpricing literature. In this study, spread is
found to be negatively but insignificantly related to IR. This goes against our second
hypothesis that postulates that deeper underpricing is often followed by higher
underwriter spread and is inconsistent with Chen and Mohan’s (2002) finding that the
more the spread, the more will be the underpricing. In this study, earnings forecasts
error (EF_BIAS) is positively and significantly associated with IR. The positive
coefficient of EF_BIAS supports our third hypothesis that forecast error proxies
ex ante uncertainty and is positively associated with the IPO IR. The result indicates
that share price heightens in reaction to the negative forecasts errors and it reduces in
reaction to positive ones on the date of announcement. This supports Henry et al.’s
(2002) research, which was focussed on Australian IPOs. In addition, the result does not
support the notion that investors are able to accurately predict forecast bias and
incorporate it to the pricing of IPOs[4]. The finding regarding earnings forecasts
accuracy (EF-ACCURACY) shows a negative and significant association with IPO
underpricing. This explains that the higher the forecast accuracy of management,
the lower will be the underpricing. It supports our fourth hypothesis stating that the
higher the forecast accuracy, the lower will be the asymmetric information, hence, less
IPO underpricing.
In terms of control variables, we found that family ownership (FOWN) is negatively
related with IR. The result is consistent with Shi et al. (2012), in that IPO companies
having more family directors are less underpriced. We also report that the more
management ownership (MOWN) there is, the less there will be the IPO underpricing.
On the other hand, the auditor’s quality (AUD) has the opposite sign. However, the
result is statistically insignificant. As the case with prior studies, the result of CSIZE in
this study revealed that the lowest underpriced IPOs are those wherein most of the
incorporated companies are large companies. On the basis of the theoretical argument,
big companies are expected to be well established and have a great experience.
They have lower information asymmetry compared to their smaller counterparts.
Additionally, a positive relationship was found between underpricing and IPO
company age (CAGE ). In other words, the longer the operating history of the IPO, the







































company age and IR goes against the ex ante uncertainty model (Beatty and Ritter,
1986). Based on the signaling theory, age proxies ex ante risk and in this case investors
are privy to information of old companies and hence, uncertainty is lower. The forecast
horizon (FHORIZON) variable is positively and highly significant in relation with IR.
The delay in issuing subscription and the prolonged stock exchange listing shows that
long forecast horizon could affect IPO valuation negatively owing to the increased
noise and uncertainty. This risk is mitigated by the heavy underpricing in new issues.
The leverage (LEV) is negatively related with IPO underpricing and this result is
consistent with that of Sun and Liu’s (2009).
5. Robustness analysis
5.1 Sensitivity analysis on underpricing
In the above analysis, underpricing is defined as (IRi,t¼ ((Pi,1 –Pi,0)/Pi,0)× 100 percent).
In this section, robustness of our results is checked and accordingly, we present the
results using market adjusted initial return (MAIR) as the proxy of IPO underpricing.
The distinction between this proxy and IR was more evident in the 1990s when the
listings are conducted way after the offering. In large time lag periods, several changes
in market dynamics could take place and the IR may be influenced by them. Therefore,
the raw IR is adjusted for market variances. Owing to the size and markets variation of
the sample companies, the KLSE index is employed to calculate MAIR:





whereMAIRi,t is the market adjusted IR of company i; IRi,t is the IR of company i; Ii,1 is
the KLSE composite index at the end of the first trading day of company i; Ii,0 is the
KLSE composite index at the end of the approval day of company i. We find that the
mean ofMAIR is about 19.73 percent which is less than IR (21.22 percent) found earlier.
The regression analysis (I) reported in Table VI shows that the results of the
experimental variables are similar to those of initial regression using IR as IPO
underpricing proxy in Table V.
5.2 Alternative measurements for some experimental variables
In the results of regression (II) presented in Table VI, IR is considered as the dependent
variable but with different measurement for the UND_MS, EF_BIAS and
EF-ACCURACY. The UND_MS is measured as a dummy variable equal to “1”, if
the underwriter is among the four most reputable banks; AmInvestment Bank, CIMB
Investment Bank Berhad, Alliance Investment Bank Berhad and MIMB Investment
Bank Berhad, otherwise equal to “0.” Similar to Jog and McConomy’s (2003) study, in
this part, this study measured EF_BIAS as a dummy variable equal to “1” if the
forecast is optimistic, and “0” if not. For the EF-ACCURACY, we used squared forecast
error metric as the squared of difference between actual earnings and the earnings
forecasts scaled by earnings forecasts. The results of regression (II) slightly differs
from the initial one in Table V. Here, the EF_BIAS is significant at the level of
10 percent and EF-ACCURACY is insignificant.
6. Conclusion
The main purpose of this study is to examine the effect of attributes of underwriters
and management earnings forecasts on the underpricing of Malaysian IPOs.








































share on IPO underpricing, the impact of charged fees by the underwriter on IPO
underpricing, the impact of optimistic/pessimistic earnings forecast on underpricing
and finally, the issue of the earnings forecast accuracy level and its relationship with
underpricing. The primary contribution of this study is the examination of the
addressed issues based on Malaysian data.
The sample comprised of 190 IPOs issued in the period 2002-2012. The results
showed a significant decrease in the IPO underpricing of Malaysian companies over
time. This study employed pooled regression equation to model IR. The results show
that IR, on average, are higher for IPO companies having highly relative market share
and less underwriting spread. Further, the management earnings forecast risk-
underpricing relationship is supported. According to the results, a positive and
statistically significant coefficient exists between earnings forecasts bias and
Regression I Regression II
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
Experimental variables
UND_MS 0.107 0.87 4.651 1.55
UND_SPR −1.352 −1.43 −1.076 −1.11
EF_BIAS 0.103 3.03** 6.231 2.30*
EF-ACCURACY −0.081 −2.18* −0.001 −0.32
Control variables
FOWN 0.007 0.09 −0.005 −0.06
MOWN −0.148 −1.45 −0.1802 −1.68*
AUD 1.497 0.55 1.115 0.39
CSIZE −3.584 −2.36* −5.214 −3.34***
CAGE 2.748 1.78* 3.583 2.22*
FHORIZON 1.470 3.24*** 1.115 2.44**
LEV −2.654 −0.47 −11.023 −1.85*
Constant 43.962 2.42** 63.083 3.36***
n 166 164
Adjusted R2 10.6% 11.71%
F-value 2.78** 2.97***
Notes: This table reports the robustness check of the pooled OLS regression results of equation 2
using MAIR as a dependent variable in regression I and different measurements for experimental
variables in regression II. UND_MS is the ringgit value for all shares underwritten by the underwriter
divided by the ringgit value of all IPOs in the sample. UND_SPR is the ratio of the gross fees charged
by the underwriter including underwriting commission, management fees, sales commissions and
other fees charged by the underwriter to the gross proceeds of the issue. Earnings forecasts bias
(EF_BIAS)¼ (actual earnings− forecast earnings)/| forecast earnings|. Earnings forecasts accuracy
(EF-ACCURACY)¼ | (actual earnings− forecast earnings)|/| forecast earnings|. FOWN is the percen-
tage of shares retained by the family members on the IPO board of directors.MOWN is the percentage
of shares retained by the executive directors on the IPO board of directors. AUD is a dummy variable
equal to “1” if auditor is Big 4 and “0” otherwise. CSIZE is the ln of total assets, at the date of IPO
prospectus. CAGE is the ln (1+ number of years between incorporation date and the IPO date).
FHORIZON is the number of months between the management forecast date (prospectus date) to
end of the period for which the forecast has been conducted. LEV is total liabilities over the total assets.
According to Belsley et al. (1980), outliers are identified when the absolute values of the observations’
studentized residuals are two or greater. To confirm and delete the outliers, this study conducts
the studentized residuals test. Therefore, 24 and 26 IPO companies have been removed from



















































underpricing, which supports the proposition that investors are incapable of predicting
the sign of the earnings forecasts error and employ this prediction in share pricing.
Nevertheless, giving conservative forecasts as opposed to optimistic ones does not help
in mitigating the level of underpricing although the benefit of such forecast may not be
evident in the short-term. For earnings forecasts accuracy, it does decrease the IPO
underpricing. In other words, providing accurate forecasts is beneficial to forecasters as
they are able to be related with less underpricing level.
Our paper has implications to regulators, investors as well as underwriters. Its analysis
of the roles of various players (i.e. issuers, underwriters, and investors) and the related
institutional arrangements upon the market may offer some information to policy makers
who are responsible for Malaysian financial markets current reforms. Further, the
examination of the economic outcome of the disclosing of earnings forecasts on
underpricing is important for policy makers and different stock exchanges in their
discussion of costs of litigation and potential modifications in the requirements of issuing
earnings forecasts. For the investors, results may improve their insights of equity
valuation. With regards to the underwriters, it would assist them in identifying
underwriting cost. It is believed that studying the underwriting spread will assist in better
comprehending other issues that are linked to the IPO costs in the Malaysian market.
The findings of this research provides an opportunity for further research to
investigate the effect of underwriter’s market share and spread, and the management
earnings forecasts bias and accuracy, on the IPO performance in the long-term. Future
studies may also evaluate whether or not management earnings forecasts bias and
accuracy influence the potential of companies to carry out subsequent seasoned equity
offerings in the future. Another extension of this research would be to examine the
determinants and characteristics of underwriting market share in-depth along
the spread in the context of the IPO market in Malaysia. Finally, as a limitation of our
study, caution should be applied when generalizing the results of the study since it is
restricted to Malaysian IPO environment and may not be applicable to other
environments such as those that have strong protection for investors.
Notes
1. In this paper, we use underpricing and raw initial returns interchangeably.
2. In this paper, we use underwriter and investment bank interchangeably.
3. The banks are Amlnvestment Bank Berhad, CIMB Investment Bank Berhad, MIMB
Investment Bank Berhad, RHB Investment Bank Berhad and Maybank Investment Bank.
4. When the shares are first listed on the stock exchange, investors are expected to add a higher
premium to the offering price if they know that the forecasted earnings are excessively
pessimistic. This suggests that the price is based on the earnings forecasts. On the other
hand, if investors know that earnings forecasts are excessively optimistic, subsequently the
price of listing can be lower than offering price.
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